'MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS - THE IMMIGRATION EXCEPTION IN THE RACE RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) ACT 2000' - INTRODUCTION
Ann Dummett, ILPA, April 2001
This compilation can be read as a narrative, but its main purpose is to provide practical assistance to legal practitioners concerned with immigration, asylum and nationality. Like ILPA’s earlier publications on the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and the Human Rights Act 1998, it gives extracts from ministerial statements as a guide to what the courts may consider to be Parliament’s intentions in passing legislation: in this case the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.
In one way, the impression given by these extracts is misleading if one looks at the Act as a whole. The emphasis everywhere, except in the sections concerned with what will here be called the immigration exemption, is on extending powers to deal with racial discrimination in all its forms, on promoting equal opportunities and on requiring new duties from public authorities so as to create an equal, multiracial, multicultural society. The tone of debates on all these proposals is unusually amicable; there is broad support from all sides of the House by the time the Bill reaches its final stages. Criticisms made at an early stage were accepted by the Government, notably with indirect as well as direct discrimination being covered. By the end of the Commons Committee stage, speakers from all parties were congratulating each other. Yet on the immigration exemption, any criticisms were stonewalled. The Government’s position was starkly different from its position on all other parts of the Bill, and the concessions made to critics were nugatory.
All immigration laws are of necessity discriminatory on grounds of nationality, since they must distinguish between nationals of the legislating state and non-nationals. Whether, or in what circumstances, such discrimination is justifiable on moral, social or economic grounds is outside the scope of this publication, but legally there can be no doubt that international law permits states to control the entry and stay of non-nationals. At the same time, international law requires states to admit their own nationals. And it has certain norms which states are expected to observe, one of which is that there should in general be no discrimination on racial grounds.
On their surface, British immigration statutes have not been racially discriminatory. In their effects, it has been argued since the 1960s that they have been so. The possibility of effective discrimination lies in the very large discretion which the legislation has afforded to the Secretary of State, not only since the 1960s but in the aliens legislation of 1905, 1914 and 1919 which established much of the machinery of modern controls. The possibility also exists for other forms of discrimination (of which there was a great deal, in the first half of the twentieth century, on political grounds); likewise, of course there is the possibility of positive forms of discrimination or of no particular form of discrimination at all beyond the distinction between British citizens and others.
Some of the ways in which some applicants have been treated differently from others were described at length in the report of a formal investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality, published in 1985. The CRE had had great difficulty in making the investigation, the Home Office having objected, but the High Court decided in October 1980 that the CRE’s duty to promote good race relations permitted the work to be carried out. The Court "could not accept that Parliament must be assumed to have intended, as the Home Office contends, that the field of immigration should be a no-go area for the Commission". The report concluded inter alia that there should be a major change of emphasis in the procedures. A significant number of genuine applicants were being refused. In countries where there was supposed to be "pressure to emigrate", procedures were heavily biased against acceptance of individuals. Among would-be visitors, those from New Commonwealth or other Third World countries were the most likely to be refused or detained at port or admitted under more restrictive conditions. For example, in 1980, visitors from the New Commonwealth or Pakistan were 30 times more likely to be refused than visitors from the Old Commonwealth. Procedures for admitting spouses from the Indian sub-continent were often drawn out for years, while spouses from New Zealand or Canada met no difficulty. Differential treatment in family reunion caused particular concern. The appeals system had not impinged on any of the fundamental problems in immigration control procedures. Cautiously expressed though the whole report was, it confirmed criticisms of unfair bias against applicants from non-white countries. Its quotations from unpublished instructions to immigration and entry clearance staff show that, if the full force of the anti-discrimination measures in the Race Relations Act 1976 had been applicable to immigration control, procedures would have had to be radically and fundamentally altered.
In the debates on the Race Relations (Amendment) Bill 1999 (now the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000) the government sought and obtained Parliamentary approval for Ministers to discriminate on the grounds of nationality or ethnic or national origin in the administration of immigration, asylum and nationality law.
Ministers are not to be allowed to discriminate on grounds of race or colour in these fields. How the distinction is to be made between race or colour and ethnic or national origins is not, even after many hours of debate, obvious, although Ministers repeated that they wanted the matter to be "crystal clear".
Ministers have become very wary of making "Pepper and Hart statements". Since it was decided in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart (1993 AC 593) that lawyers may refer in court to clear ministerial statements made during the passage of a Bill in order to clarify the meaning of the legislation concerned, few hostages have been given to fortune. Therefore, passages of careful Home Office prose are frequently repeated in the Government statements on this Bill, while many questions posed by opponents of the "immigration exemption" were simply left unanswered. For these reasons, the following compilation of ministerial statements includes some quite lengthy extracts from speeches by the exemption’s critics. The failure to answer directly may provide at least a negative idea of the Government’s intentions.
The new provision and the arguments about them have received virtually no general publicity. The Long Title of the Bill said only that it was "to extend further the application of the Race Relations Act 1976 to the police and other public authorities; to amend the exemption under that Act for acts done for the purpose of safeguarding national security, and for connected purposes". There was nothing to suggest that a change to immigration, asylum and nationality law would be one of the connected purposes. Organisations and individuals concerned with immigration were not alerted. Newspaper reports concentrated on the Bill’s main avowed purpose: to respond to the Macpherson report on the death of Stephen Lawrence.
The Act prohibits discrimination by all public authorities, including central Government, following the definition of public authority in the Human Rights Act. It imposes on certain listed authorities a duty to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations, and the Commission for Racial Equality is given new powers to assist compliance. The Home Office will be bound by these provisions – except in the administration of immigration, asylum and nationality law. Thus IND’s employment policies are covered in the main Act but not its behaviour. Officials may under instructions from a Minister or on a Minister’s personal decision discriminate on grounds of nationality, or ethnic or national origin.
The exemption concerning decisions on the grounds of nationality is reasonable enough in immigration law, where different treatment between British citizens and others, and between EEA nationals, Association Agreement nationals and others already exists on legal and defensible grounds. But to be able to discriminate on grounds of nationality in the treatment of asylum-seekers, for example when taking decisions on detention, or exceptional leave to remain, rather than on the basis of an individual’s claim of persecution, is questionable. Just as dubious is the authorisation to discriminate on nationality grounds in the grant of British citizenship. One can see no rationale for this, and indeed the Government did not offer one during the debates. Since there is no appeal against refusal of British citizenship, and the Home Secretary is not bound to give reasons for refusal, one might say cynically that the new provision hardly matters. But it does matter, like the rest of the exemption, because it writes a hitherto unacceptable form of discrimination into statute law.
The puzzle is, how is anyone going to distinguish in practice between discrimination, on grounds of "race or colour" on the one hand and "ethnic or national origin" on the other? Ministers will decide. They are to deal "very firmly" with the former, which is unlawful, while authorising the latter, quite lawfully. But suppose a Chinese, who has been discriminated against on the latter, lawful ground, claims he has been refused because of his race or colour. How will his race or colour be distinguishable from his ethnic or national origin? The point was argued forcefully by Lord Lester in the House of Lords:
House of Lords Hansard text,
14.12.99
Unlike discrimination on grounds of nationality or place or residence, discrimination based on ethnic or national origins is as much racial discrimination as is discrimination based on colour or race, as the definition of racial discrimination in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 1966 makes crystal clear. Such discrimination involves treating one individual less favourably than another for what is not chosen by them but for what is innate in them at birth – their genetic inheritance – whether as ethnic Jews, Roma gypsies or Hong Kong Indians. It is as invidious and unfair as is discrimination based on the colour of a person’s skin. That is why the Race Relations Act 1976 forbids direct discrimination on any of those racial grounds, apart from a range of clearly defined exceptions.
The sweepingly broad exception in Section 19C is incompatible with the very principle of non-discrimination which the legislation is intended to secure. If the Home Office wishes to make special arrangements aimed at providing protection to particular groups seeking shelter in the United Kingdom, such as the Bosnians and Kosovars who were granted exceptional leave to remain during the recent crisis in the Balkans, it is difficult to understand how that would require an exception. The reason for affording favourable treatment to some of those groups is surely not their ethnic or national origins but their well-founded fear of persecution, the urgency of their humanitarian needs and the need to comply with the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention. The policy is not based upon or caused by their ethnicity. It does not involve discriminating against anyone on the grounds of their ethnic or national origins.
As the Government have correctly stated in the UK report to the CERD Committee, which is the UN committee (CERD/C/299/Add.9, 2nd December 1966, paragraph 58),
"There is nothing racist about designating countries which produce large numbers of unfounded asylum applications".
The same is true of refugee situations, if humanitarian provision is made, not on the basis of nationality or ethnic or national origin, but on the basis of an objective assessment of the conditions in the country concerned. The Section 19C exception is therefore not only unsightly, but unnecessary.
I go further. Even if it were appropriate, for the avoidance of doubt, to include an exception to cover situations of that kind, the exception to the fundamental right to equal treatment without discrimination would need to be prescribed in legislation in a way carefully tailored to what is necessary to give effect to the Government’s legitimate aims, with adequate judicial safeguards against the abuse of this extraordinary power, to ensure that the doing of a discriminatory act is justified by its purpose, as with national security.
The functions covered by Section 19C include decisions to deport, exclusion directions, leave to enter or remain, the grant asylum, exceptional leave to remain, and even naturalisation as a British citizen. Section 44 of the British Nationality Act 1981 provides that any discretion vested by that Act in the Secretary of State, a governor or lieutenant governor, must be exercised,
"without regard to the race, colour or religion of any person who may be affected by its exercise".
Yet Section 19C would allow the discretion to be exercised on the basis of ethnic or national origins which are part of the international legal definition of what constitutes "racial discrimination".
As it stands, Section 19C authorises breaches by a future populist illiberal Home Secretary, or by a prejudiced administration, of the various international human right conventions by which the UK is bound: notably, Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and Articles 2 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 obliges contracting states to apply the convention’s provisions to refugees,
"without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin".
That covers discrimination on grounds of a refugee’s ethnic or national origins. The UNHCR executive committee, of which the UK is an original member, has emphasised that decisions on asylum must be made without discrimination as to race, religion, political opinion, nationality or country of origin (Executive Committee Conclusion No. 15(XXX) 1979; also Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) 1981). Section 19C authorises practices and procedures in relation to immigration and nationality which would be incompatible with the refugee convention too.
We hope that the Government will agree to remove or to narrow Section 19C by limiting the exception, if the must, to special treatment on humanitarian grounds.
The Government’s answer was that the powers in the Act will be subjected to very close safeguards. "It will be unlawful for immigration staff to discriminate on grounds of race, colour, or, in the case of nationality and ethnic and national origins, go beyond what is specified in immigration and nationality law or expressly authorised by Ministers" (the Home Secretary, Mr. Jack Straw, HC Second Reading, 9.3.2000, col. 1211). Both senior and junior staff will have to work within instructions from a Minister, and if they go outside these instructions and commit any act of unlawful race discrimination they will be dealt with "very firmly". The instructions will not go beyond what is "justified" and "necessary". The measures "are necessary to allow our immigration laws to continue to be administered as Parliament intended" (Lord Bassam, HL 14.12.99). They are justified by the need to deal with criminal "scams" on the one hand and to enable positive discrimination in favour of certain ethnic groups (e.g. Kosovar Albanians) on the other. These points are frequently repeated by Ministers.
The Minister’s reference to Parliament’s intentions in passing immigration legislation suggests that ministerial statements on that earlier legislation must be read together with statements on the Race Relations (Amendment) Bill. To put it crudely, did Parliament intend in the earlier legislation that the immigration authorities should be able to discriminate on grounds of ethnic or national origin? Did Parliament believe that such discrimination was necessary and justified? And if Parliament did so believe about immigration generally, did it also believe such discrimination necessary and justified in determining claims for asylum?
The example of Kosovar Albanians was cited several times as a justification for discrimination in asylum policy: they had received favourable treatment in 1999 whereas Serbs from Kosovo had been considered ineligible for asylum. Amendments that would have allowed positive discrimination in similar circumstances, while forbidding other discrimination on grounds of ethnic or national origin, were repeatedly rejected. So was the more cogent argument that, according to international law, each individual application for asylum must be considered on its merits. (It was not impossible, in the early months of the Kosovo crisis, for an individual Serb to have a valid claim, for example.) The Government then moved to defend its proposals citing the example of ethnic Chinese arriving with Malaysian or Singaporean documents although they really came from the People’s Republic. Lord Avebury pointed out that if they did come from the People’s Republic they might have valid claims to asylum and that the production in those circumstances of false travel documents was not a criminal offence. But the government objected that, in order to combat the criminal gangs who were organising economic migration from China, Chinese-looking applicants had to be singled out. When it was pointed out that there were also criminal gangs operating to bring in white economic migrants from Russia and eastern Europe, and that immigration officials would not be able to distinguish them from any other white entrant from elsewhere in Europe, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Home Office, Mr, O’Brien, replied: "White people are not one homogeneous ethnic group, incapable of being distinguished one from another". He went on to say that "intelligence-led immigration control relies less and less" on looking at people: "information is often provided by the airline or by intelligence sources in other countries…. colour is not usually the sole basis on which an immigration officer makes a decision to stop and check someone. It is much more likely these days that he would receive information from an intelligence source and that his decision to stop and search would be unrelated to colour". (HC Committee, 13.4.2000, see p. 00) This passage, though somewhat confusing, appears to undermine the Government’s own case for taking ethnic or national origin into account.
The main opposition to the immigration exemption came from the Liberal Democrats in both Lords and Commons. The Conservative Lord Cope agreed in principle with the main objections from Lord Lester and Lord Avebury. In the Commons the strongest opposition came from Mr. Cohen of the Labour party. But many matters which will be affected by the exemption received little or no discussion. Debate was concentrated on what happens at ports and entry clearance offices, but visa policy was not discussed. Considerable numbers of people within the UK could be affected by the exemption, which could cover decisions on detention, the NASS voucher scheme, dispersal and the status of people inside the country applying for one form or another of leave to remain. Most importantly it will obviously affect asylum-seekers here. Their situation is also affected (as is that of illegal entrants not claiming asylum) by changes made in the Act to the appeals system. Some of these changes give a role to the CRE and the county court, but others are restrictive, and even the beneficial changes will not enable a decision on immigration status which is found to be discriminatory to be overturned.
S.66 of the 1976 Race Relations Act is extended to allow the CRE to give assistance to persons in immigration appeal proceedings. A finding of unlawful discrimination b the independent appellate authority in an immigration case will trigger the power of the CRE to seek an injunction under S.62 of the Race Relations Act.
S.6 of the Act makes changes to the immigration and asylum appeals procedure. Claims of unlawful racial discrimination from individuals subject to immigration control, that related specifically to a decision in an individual case, will be heard by the independent appellate authority as part of the one-stop procedure on appeals. (Claims under the Human Rights Act would likewise be heard at the same time.) If a claim is successful, it will be referred to a county court or sheriff court for damages to be assessed. The aim is "a swifter outcome" than under earlier arrangements. British citizens who claim unlawful discrimination by the immigration authorities can go straight to the county or sheriff court. In no case will the decision of such a court affect immigration decisions.
Cases with a national security element, under S.6, S.9 and Schedule 2, are appeals to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, and will thus form part of the one-stop process, established by part IV of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1999.
A person making a claim to the immigration appellate authorities will, under Schedule 2 be denied access to the questionnaire procedure under S.65 of the Race Relations Act for obtaining information from the respondent about the alleged act of discrimination. This will, according to Mr. O’Brien (HC Committee, 18.4.2000) "keep the administrative processes efficient in terms of obtaining and maintaining a faster system".
The certification procedure for an action expressly authorised by a Minister of the Crown (S.62(2)) of the Race Relations Act, will be applied to immigration appeals. Thus, where a Minister certifies that he has approved certain arrangements, that certificate shall be conclusive evidence. Furthermore, an Amendment to Schedule 4 of the RRA which inserts a new section 9A allows a Minister to certify an immigration claim if in his opinion it was manifestly unfounded. There is to be no further right of appeal to a tribunal if an adjudicator is satisfied that the action had been correctly certified.
All these changes are said to be in the interest of a "firm, fast and fair" system and to avoid "unnecessary delays". However, judicial review will still be available under the one-stop procedure. And it is important to note that the CRE now has powers to make a formal investigation and to issue a non-discrimination notice on immigration and asylum issues as on others. Everything will turn on the interpretation of the distinction between "race or colour" and "ethnic or national origin" here, as also in judicial review.
The changes were proposed at a comparatively late stage of the debates, in the House of Commons Committee, in a set of government amendments on 18 April 2000. They did not receive detailed criticism from the Liberal Democrat and Conservative speakers in the debate, and were quite quickly agreed to by them. It would indeed have been difficult, at short notice, for anyone but an experienced immigration lawyer to take in all the implications of the proposals, couched as they were in terms of numerous references to other legislation.
The exchanges on these proposals were immediately followed by discussion of national security provisions. S.7 is a liberalisation of existing law, in line with the ECHR, that it will no longer be sufficient for the Government to argue that a discriminatory act was done for the purpose of national security. On national security procedures, S.8 (new S.67A of the RRA) enables a court to exclude the claimant and the claimant’s representative where it considers it expedient to do so in the interests of national security. Subsection 2 empowers the Attorney General (in Scotland the Advocate General) to appoint representatives. Sir Robert Smith questioned whether the new provisions were in line with the ECHR. Mr. O’Brien assured him that they were, though artlessly admitting that the special advocate in the cases concerned, as an officer of the court and not a counsel who owed allegiance directly to the client, would be under no obligation to disclose to the client any matter of national security heard by the court and "That may have some prejudicial effect on the client". (For debate, see under "National Security, p.00)
At an even later stage (HC Report, 30.10.2000) the Government introduced an amendment to modify some aspects of the immigration exemption. Dealing with certain immigration offences, it placed the immigration service on the same legal basis as the police in operating the Bill’s provisions. However, "immigration service functions that support the removal or deportation of individuals from the United Kingdom" remain within the scope of the exemption.
Mr. Cohen M.P. had raised the issue of detention, but no response on this was made by the Minister. Decision on detention clearly remain within the scope of the exemption, though the treatment of persons once detained presumably falls within the duties of public authorities and of private authorities exercising public functions (e.g. prison staff and Group 4) not to discriminate.
Applicants whose visa applications have been successful but who nevertheless consider they have been racially discriminated against by an entry clearance officer may seek redress in the county court. Unsuccessful visa applicants have no such redress. Further Government Amendments at this stage included the extension, mentioned above, of the CRE’s role in immigration appeals and the extension of the Lord Chancellor’s jurisdiction under the SIAC Act 1997 to make rules.
Also in Commons Committee, the Government introduced what it described as an important exemption to the exemption. S.19E authorises the Secretary of State after consulting the CRE to appoint a monitor, not a member of his staff, having first submitted draft reports to IND, to report annually to Parliament on the operation of the exemption. The work is expected to occupy 40 days a year, and the monitor will have access to all relevant papers and will visit operational IND posts. But the monitor will not be an appellate authority and will not be concerned with recommendations on individual cases, but rather with the overall impact of the exemption. The post is comparable with the existing one of Entry Clearance Monitor.
Very little attention was paid during the debates to the authorisation for discrimination in the grant of British nationality. Lord Lester and Lord Avebury mentioned the issue briefly but the Government had no justifications to advance. Thus Parliament’s intentions here were not clarified.
In the British Nationality Act 1981, the Secretary of State must exercise his discretion to naturalise without regard to the race, colour or religion of an applicant (S.44(1)). However, under S.44(2) the Secretary of State is not required to give reasons for a refusal, so it is not possible to discover whether regard was had to race, colour or religion or not. The decision by the Court of Appeal in the cases of the Fayed brothers in 1996 stated that although the Home Secretary was not obliged under S.44(2) to give reasons for refusal, he was required, before reaching a final decision, to inform an applicant of the nature of any matters weighing against the grant of the application in order to afford the applicant an opportunity of addressing them. The fact that S.44(2) provided that the decision was not to be subject to appeal or review did not affect the obligation of the Home Secretary to be fair or interfere with the power of the court to ensure that requirements of fairness were met. The contrary argument was wholly inconsistent with the principles of administrative law.
The Fayed cases were concerned with the "good character" requirement for naturalisation. But the court held that Parliament was not, in enacting S.44(2) intending by the ouster provision to exclude the ability of the court to review a decision of the Home Secretary on the ground, for example, that he had not complied with any requirement of fairness which the Act imposed on him or the express prohibition against discrimination in S.44(1) when considering applications for naturalisation.
No case has yet been brought alleging that the Home Secretary discriminated on grounds of race, colour or religion. If one were brought, the court might have to consider the question whether "race" had the meaning in the RRA 1976 or whether it was distinct, under S.19(C) of the RRA 2000, from national or ethnic origin, and if so how.
Naturalisation is not the only means of acquiring British citizenship where the Home Secretary has a discretion. Under S.13 of the BNA 1981, the Home Secretary has discretion to register a person who has renounced British citizenship for any reason whatever, while the arrangements for resumption by entitlement are very limited. He also has discretion to register any minor, whether inside or outside the United Kingdom. This is important because the provision in the Act for entitlement to registration for minors are closely drawn. For example, a child born in the UK to asylum-seekers who had been granted only temporary leave to remain or no leave at all, might be born stateless (depending on the laws of the parent’s country), and would be entitled to registration only when over 10 and under 22 and on production of proof that he or she had always been stateless, had spent five years in the UK or the UK and a dependent territory immediately before application, and had not been absent for more than 90 days in any one year of the five. The prospects for, say a Roma child acquiring British citizenship by entitlement would clearly be negligible.
Whereas EC nationals from other states will not be affected by the immigration exemption, since their movement is governed by Community law, it is not inconceivable that in future an EC national might apply here for naturalisation and be refused without reasons being given. However, the EC Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin might be invoked by, say, a French citizen/applicant of Algerian origin. Under Article 3(2) the Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry and residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned. So, while British immigration policy is not to be affected by the Directive, it appears that naturalisation policy might be.
The other international aspects of the immigration exemption were exhaustively described by Lord Lester in the speech quoted above (see p.00). Lord Bassam, in replying, made two points: first that the exemption simply allowed "existing legislation to continue as Parliament, in our view intended"; secondly that it provided the immigration authorities "with the necessary latitude to conduct their business rationally". He then denied that the exemption would do anything to require Ministers to do anything contrary to their international obligations. "The discretion which it gives to Ministers still has to be exercised bearing in mind their international obligations. We believe that to be an important point." The point is, of course, that while Ministers might not be required to do anything contrary to their international obligations, the exemption would permit them to do so, and this statutory permission may constitute a breach of international obligations in itself.
The first ministerial authorisation under s.19D(3)(a) was made on 27 March 2001 and came into force on 2 April. It is reproduced at Appendix E. It deals with discrimination on grounds of nationality: further authorisations on grounds of nationality or ethnic origin are, at the time of going to Press, yet to come.
This first authorisation makes clear that there is to be no question of considering cases on their individual merits, or of close scrutiny beforehand of an immigration officer’s decision. "An immigration officer or as the case may be, the Secretary of State may, by reason of the person’s nationality" refuse leave to enter and exercise powers to seek information and documents if there is statistical (our italics) evidence of a pattern of breach of immigration laws by persons of the applicant’s nationality or if IND intelligence suggests that a significant number of persons of that nationality have breached or will attempt to breach the immigration laws. It is doubtful whether the very wide latitude this authorisation gives to immigration staff can be exercised within the terms of the legislation, given the many ministerial assurances made during the Parliamentary debates that guidance would be clear and unjustified discrimination eliminated.
Where a person is to be given information relating to his application or entitlement to enter or remain, "if the information is not available in a language which the person understands, it is not necessary to provide the information in a language which he does understand".
No doubt, with the Act in force, new problems will come to light. A piece of legislation which is internally so contradictory will surely soon be reviewed: it is hoped that the first cases brought will be based on firm grounds and will serve to clarify important issues within the exemption.
SPEAKERS QUOTED IN THE COMPILATION House of Lords
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab.)
Parliamentary Secretary of State, Home OfficeLord Avebury (Lib. Dem.)
Lord Cope of Berkeley (Con.)
Baroness Prashar (Lib. Dem.)
Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Lib. Dem.)
Lord Bach (Lab.)
House of Commons
Mr. Jack Straw (Lab.) Blackburn
Home SecretaryMr. Mike O’Brien (Lab.) Warwickshire North
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home OfficeMr. Simon Hughes (Lib. Dem.) Southwark North and Bermondsey
Mr. Harry Cohen (Lab.) Leyton and Wanstead
Sir Robert Smith (Lib. Dem.) Aberdeenshire West and Kincardine
Miss Ann Widdecombe (Con.) Maidstone and the Weald
Mr. David Lidington (Con.) Aylesbury
TIMETABLE OF BILL
House of Lords
First Reading 2 December 1999 Hansard col. 917 Second Reading 14 December 1999 Hansard col. 127 Committee 11 January 2000 Hansard col. 532 13 January 2000 Hansard col. 754 Report 27 January 2000 Hansard col. 1671 Third Reading 3 February 2000 Hansard col. 351 House of Commons
Second Reading 9 March 2000 Hansard col. 1203 Standing Committee 11,13,18 April and 2 May 2000 Amendments considered 30 October 2000 Hansard col. 516 House of Lords
Commons Amendments
considered27 November 2000 Hansard col. 1189 * If you would like a copy of the full report - 'Ministerial statements - the Immigration Exception in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 - please contact ILPA